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ON THE NEED FOR FISCAL
DISCIPLINE IN A UNION
ABSTRACF
This paper investigates the behavior of public debt in counties forming a union (as
outlined, e.g., by the Maastricht utaty). We consider a federal union of states where the center
has limited control over the spending patterns of the union members, and where the union
members' behavior has repercussions for the future public debt. The public has preferences
against higher public debt, and will oust high-debt administrations. A4verse shocks are shown
to induce a regime switch from a cooperative outcome to limited cooperation, and from limited
cooperation to the noncooperative outcome. While a transitory adverse shock calls for a higher
public debt in the cooperative regime, the switch towaut limited cooperation entails a drop in
the public debt (relative to the cooperative desirable outcome). With limited cooperation further
drops in income will call for a drop in public debt If the adverse shock is powerful enough,
sustaining limited cooperation may become unfeasible. A regime switch may yield nonlinearities,
where the macroeconomic behavior is abruptly altered following the switch. Our model provides
a tentative support for limits on public debt, needed to free the instrument of deficit financing





and NBER1.Introduction and Summary
The ambitious agenda outlined in the Maastricht Treaty envisions the
transformation of Western Europe into an economic union. According to the
Treaty, the transition towards the union must be supported by a proper
macroeconomic convergence of the various countries.1 Consequently, a significant
literature has emerged addressing both the wisdom and the need for imposing these
criteria. A contested issue is the degree that a tight fiscal harmonization is entailed
by the Union, and the need to restrict the public debt/GDP ratios tolerated among
the countries forming the Union.2 Obviously, this issue is of concern beyond
Europe —andfaces any country that is a federation of local governments.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the need for fiscal discipline for an
economy where the center has limited control over the spending patterns of the
union members, and where the union members behavior has repercussions for the
future public debt. In practice, most unions are characterized by such a structure,
differing in the degree to which the center has control of the fiscal behavior of its
members, and the degree to which the union members have the ability to roil over
part of their expenditure to the center. A recent painful example of this
phenomenon is the S&L crisis in the USA, which illustrated that some of the
1 The "convergence criteria" states that a country can join the union if its
inflation rate is not more than 1.5% higher than the three lowest inflation rates in
the EMS, its long-term interest rate is not more than 2% higher than the average
observed in the three low-inflation countries, it has not experienced a currency
realignment in the two years preceding the entrance in the union, its government
budget deficit in not higher than 3% of its GD?, and its public debt/GM? ratio is
below 60%.
2 For a review of this debate, see Wyplosz (1991) and De Grauwe (1993).-2-
transmissiongenerating the over-expenditure is accomplished via financial
intermediation. For example, provincial government may encourage (or overlook)
the provision of credit by local banks to questionable local businesses against IOU
notes. Upon the collapse of some of these businesses there is political pressure on
the central government to bail out the local banks (and perhaps the local
businesses). If the financing of this rescue is done by increasing the public debt, the
ultimate risk undertaking and expansionary policy of local provinces (or states)
determines the volume of the questionable credit. Occasionally, the weakness of the
center is manifested directly in the excessive spending of provincial governments.
In developing countries where the fiscal authorities are weak, the central bank
frequently uses seigniorage to finance the bailing out, resulting in high inflation.
Our paper ignores this possibility, and focuses instead on the case where the
marginal financing is done by public debt.3
The modeling strategy of the paper is to focus on a generic model where there
is an interaction between the center and the peripheries under conditions of limited
monitoring. We refrain from modeling the institutional details that enable the
opportunistic behavior of economic decision makers, as the reduced-form approach
may encompass various economic structures. Consider an economy where the
treasury is relatively weak, and where the fiscal decisions are the outcome of the
behavior of several competing policy makers. We call the collective body,consisting
of these policy makers, the administration. The decision makersrepresent various
interest groups that compete for fiscal resources. These interestgroups may be
provincial governments in a country composed of several provinces, or states in a
fiscal union, or any pressure groups seeking topromote their own agenda. The
See Aizenman (1993) for a study of soft budget constraints where themarginal
finance is done by seigniorage.-3-
administration allocates the planned fiscal outlays among the decision makers. In
the short-run policy makers may abuse their official budgets, entailing higher pubic
debt. Overtime, such opportunistic behavior is detected and punished by removing
the policy makers and the administration. The public has preferences against higher
public debt (as it reduces the future fiscal resources available for the provision of
public goods or for public investment). It uses the public debt as an indicator
regarding the competence of the administration to restrain the various decision
makers, and will oust high debt administrations. We do not model the public
behavior directly.Instead, we are taking a reduced-form approach, where
consumers preferences are reflected by their voting pattern, ousting high public
debt administrations.4
Our economy is characterized by negative externalities akin to the common
pool problem.5 The ability of local policy makers to shift some of their expenditure
to the common pool of public debt encourages them to overspend, as they will share
only part of the burden of future taxes, while sharing fully the present benefits. The
ultimate outcome of the resultant externalities is that a noncooperative regime
4 Our model can be extended to allow part of the tax revenue to be spent on the
provision of a public good. Our results continue to hold as long as the policy
makers have the ability to use fiscal resources to expand their own consumption.
5 On the interplay of these externalities in a common currency area see, e.g.,
Canzoneri (1989), Casella (1991) and Aizenman (1992). On coordination porbiems in
the macro context see, for example, Hamada (1976), Bryant (1985), Canzoneri and
Gray (1985), Buiter and Marston (1985), Turnovsky, Basar and Dorey (1988), Rogoff
(1989), Alesina and Drawn (1991), Cukierman (1992) and Tornell and Velasco (1992).
For a survey of the literature on macroeconomic policies and politics see Persson
and Tabetlini (1990).-4-
yields excessive current spending and shortens the effective planning horizon of the
policy makers. The administration has a control variable (the planned public debt)
that determines the planned fiscal allocation to the decision makers. The
administration sets policies that maximize the expected utility of the representative
decision maker, subject to the constraints imposed by their behavior. The existence
of adverse externalities implies that the administration should set policies that
induce the individual decision makers to prefer the cooperative outcome. The
problem is akin to the organization of an intertemporal cartel, where the cartel
manager chooses a price that is consistent with the lack of opportunistic behavior.
Our model supports the notion that the macroeconomic equilibrium is
characterized by the existence of several regimes: cooperative, limited cooperation,
and noncooperative regimes. A Fully cooperative regime is supported if policies
that maximize the expected utility of a representative decision maker lead to an
outcome where none of the decision makers has the incentive to deviate.
Otherwise, the administration will be forced to scale down the planned fiscal
expenditure (and the resultant public debt) to the highest level that entails
cooperation. We refer to the resultant outcome as limited cooperation. If the
attainment of limited cooperation is not feasible, policy makers end up behaving
opportunistically. This behavior entails maximizing their welfare while ignoring
the resultant negative externalities, leading to the noncooperative regime.
Adverse shocks are shown to induce a regime switch from a cooperative
outcome to limited cooperation. A large enough unfavorable disturbance induces a
switch to the noncooperative outcome. While a transitory adverse shock calls for a
higher public debt in the cooperative regime (in order to offset the transitory decline
in income, thereby smoothing consumption), the switch towards limited
cooperation entails a drop in the public debt (relative to the cooperative desirable
outcome). The adverse shock encourages the opportunistic behavior by increasing-5-
themarginal evaluation of the benefits of extra resources (due to the principle of
diminishing marginal utility) and by shortening the planning horizon of decision
makers. A drop in public debt is needed to "police" the union, preventing the
tendency to overspend and to end up with the noncooperative outcome.
When we are in the limited cooperation regime, the binding constraint
determining the pattern of public debt and fiscal expenditure is the incentive
constraint: preventing opportunistic behavior. This implies that with limited
cooperation further drops in income will call for a dropinpublic debt, an outcome
that does not occur in the cooperative regime. If the adverse shock is powerful
enough, sustaining limited cooperation may become unfeasible.In these
circumstances we end up in the noncooperative regime, where the behavior of the
various decision makers shorten the effective horizon of all. Consequently, a
regime switch resulting from adverse shocks may change the correlation among
macroeconomic variables. In addition, it may yield nonlinearities, where the
macroeconomic behavior is abruptly altered following the regime switch, which in
turn will occur if the severity of adverse shocks reaches a certain threshold. Finally,
our model provides a tentative support for limits on public debt, needed to free the
instrument of deficit financing for use in bad recessions.
Before turning to the present paper, it is constructive to place it in its proper
context within the existing literature. A recent contribution by Alesina and Darzen
(1989) explained delays in stabilization in terms of a war of attrition between
competing groups who behave noncooperatively. They focused on the timing of
the switch from a noncooperative to a cooperative outcome. This paper serves to
illuminate the conditions inducing the opposite shift --switchingthe economy
from a well-behaved regime where agents cooperate to a noncooperative outcome.
This paper illustrates too that the menu of possible regimes is tither than the
extremes of cooperative and noncooperative behavior, and that the regime switch-6-
has important implications for the continuity of and the correlation among
macroeconomic variables.
Section 2 of the paper introduces the model. In section 3 we characterize the
possible regimes, the conditions yielding a regime switch, and the resultant patterns
of the correlation among macroeconomic shocks. Section 4 closes the paper with
concluding remarks.
2.The Model
We review in this section the budget constraints, the political uncertainty,
and the timing of events in the model.
2.1The planned budget
The union is composed of n symmetric provinces (or states), each managed by
a decision maker. The federal administration has access to fiscal revenue (F), which
are equally divided among the states. The fiscal plan for period t is guided by a
budget. It specifies a planned fiscal allocation of Gt;i to n decision makers (i =1...n).
The allocation divides equally the tax revenue (denoted by T), and finances the rest
by issuing public debt, in the form of a one-period bond. We denote by hr and bt the
planned and the actual sales of these bonds in period t. Thus:
(1) d=Tt+hf-(l+r)b1
where r is the real interest rate, assumed to beexogenously given. The tax rate is
denoted by r, the GNP by?, so that T ='rY. To focus on the role of the public debt,
we assume that the tax rate and output are exogenously given, and that the only
control variable available to the administration is the planned sales of bonds,hr.-7-
2.2Budget constraints andthepolitical uncertainty
The actual behavior of policy makers may diverge from the planned budget.
Within each period there is limited monitoring of the actual activities of the
decision maker. Each of them has a degree of flexibility in dictating the effective
resources allocated to him from the center, so that the realized budget constraint
facing a decision maker (assuming that he is not detected) is given by:
(2) =t,i+
whereC measures the opportunistic consumption of decision maker i. The
limited monitoring is manifested as a probability of detection: the actual fiscal
behavior of decision maker i will be revealed within the period with a probability of
A. This probability depends positively on the rate of the opportunistic consumption




where (3a) and (3b) are the detection probabilities in the first and the second period,
respectively.6 Thus, opportunistic behavior pays (at most) for the duration of two
periods.
6 Note that the detection probability raises over time. The assumption that
detection is certain after two periods is done to simplify notation. Our analysis can
be readily extended to the case where there is no truncation of the horizon of the
opportunistic decision makers. This will be the case where the detection probability-8-
The realized public debt is the outcome of the behavior Qf all the decision
makers:
(4) bf =bfl Ch
Its value is revealed at the end of period t, and the public uses it as an indicator
regarding the competence of the administration. A higher value of the public debt
implies that a greater portion of the tax revenue will be used to service the public
debt, and hence less tax revenue will be available for fiscal activities (either for the
provision of public goods or for public investment). Hence, a higher fiscal deficit is
viewed as undesirable by the public, reducing the survival of the administration
from period t to period t+l.
We denote by 4,the survival probability of period Vs administration to
period t+l, and assume that 4,=,(br),where 4?(O) =0,$cOand 4," cO for b> 0.
If the administration is removed from office at the end ofperiod t, it is replaced by a
new one.7 We assume the absence of reputation effects, and thus all
at period t +j isa function X( )ofthe net present value of all the opportunistic
spending (discounted to period t+j). All the key results can be shown to apply to this
modified case.
7 We assume that the election of a new administrationimplies the removal of
all the preceding policy makers. Ouranalysis continues to apply for the cases where
each policy maker i faces independent election, and his reelectionprobability is 4,j.If
the repayment of the outstanding public debt is sharedequally among the voters,
the reelection probability of decision maker i will beadversely affected by the
aggregate public debt, and positively related to the realized fiscal consumption in
state (or province) i. Hence, in this case-9-
administrations and decision makers are alike. The representative decision maker
(indexed by i) is maximizing his expected utility from his fiscal expenditure, given
by
(5) Vu=Et(pk.tu(Q.,.)} ; p￿ 1,
k=t
andE denotes the expectation operator, based upon the information available at
period t, and U is the period utility function, satisfying U' >0and U' cO, and U =0
if the policy maker is out of office. The administration is setting policies in order to
maximize the expected utility of the representative decision maker, taking into
account the behavior of the atomistic decision maker as a feasibility constraint on
the set of policies.
2.3The timing of events
At the beginning of period t the administration determines the planned
allocation to the various states, t,i' This decision is equivalent to the
determination of the planned public debt, bç (note that the tax revenue T is
exogenously given). Next, decision makers are determining their actual use of
resources, 0tJ• The actual fiscal behavior of decision maker i will be revealed
within the period with a probability of A. Decision makers that are detected abusing
the planned allocation will be removed from office.8 At the end of the period the
actual aggregate deficit 14isrevealed. Elections are taking place in between the two
= bt); witha ja C>0 and a,1m 14 < 0.It can be verified that the key results
of our paper continue to apply in this modified structure.
8 Detection and removal from office implies that the decision maker's utility at
that period is normalized to zero. We assume that detection occurs after the
commitment of resources, hence it does not impact the aggregate actual public debt.- 10-
periods,and the present administration is reelected with probability t•9 The
elected administration starts its tenure at the beginning of period t+1.
3.Equilibrium and tacit cooperation
We turn now to characterize the equilibrium in several steps: First, we
analyze the conditions determining the behavior of a policy maker who behaves
opportunistically. Next, we analyze the incentive constraints imposed by the
opportunistic policy makers on the behavior of the administration. Finally, we
apply these constraints to characterize the factors determining the degree of
cooperation achieved via tacit cooperation.
Formally, our framework is a repeated game, in which a one-period
simultaneous move game is repeated each period.10 At each date t, players know all
the moves before t. As is usual in this context, multiple equilibria are sustainable
with the appropriate punishment. Following the literature, we focus on the
symmetric, efficient equilibrium from the players' viewpoint. For a given planned
deficit we derive the optimal behavior of each decision maker. Sequential
rationality and efficiency will be shown to require the administration to choose the
public debt that maximizes the welfare of the representative decision maker subject
to a feasibility constraint The planned public debt rate must be chosen so as to
prevent the opportunistic behavior of the atomistic decision makers.
Recall that we assume that detection is certain after two periods. Hence, in
between period t and t+1 any remaining decision makers that abused their budget
constraints in period t-1 are removed from office.
0For a review of repeated games and tacit cooperation see Tirole (1988).— 11-
Weturn now to evaluate the behavior of the opportunistic decision maker in
his first period in office. A policy maker that chooses to behave opportunistically at
period t knows that he is out of his office within not more than two periods.
Applying (2), (3), and (5) we conclude that he sets C? in order to maximize his
expected utility at time t (denoted by I
(6) V1!0= (1-xa[U(G) +P$t+i(1- Xt+i)U(Gt,i+i)]
yielding the following first-order cond.itioxt
aviO_0
Li
where MUtlo stands for the marginal utility at date t, evaluated at the opportunistic
level of consumption.11 The optimal opportunistic consumption equates the
marginal benefit attributed to more resources obtained with the marginal cost
generated by the higher probability of detection.
We turn now to characterize the cooperative regime. The expected utility





11The condition is that
(1- XJMU1I0 =?4U(GLi)+p4+i (1-x+OU(G1+i)] +?.+1p(1+r)41+i(l-XJU(Gi+l) +
(1-xjp(1-X.i) {(l+r*+iMut+iio4oU(GLl+l))
The assumption that detection is certain after two periods implies that the condition
determining C.11 is (1- X+1)MUL+IIo =- 12 -
Wenow evaluate the public debt policy implemented by the authorities. Applying
(8) it follows that
a —MUI-p(l+r)4+iMLJt÷tlc
(9)
— + 4,+' pV.1I
Startingwith zero public debt, the expected utility in the cooperative
equilibrium will tend to rise with the public debt (recall that 4i'(O) =O).12 Aswe
increase the public debt, the marginal benefit of the debt is eroded, while the cost (in
terms of reducing the reelection probability) goes up. Hence, for a large enough
public debt the expected utility in the cooperative regime will start declining with
future increase in the public debt The optimal public debt in a cooperative regime
(denoted by b) is determined by the condition that =0it balances the
marginal value of resources achieved by higher public debt with the marginal cost
resultant from the drop in the administrations probability of survival and the
higher future repayment. Figure 1 summarizes the possible regimes. Curve CC
describes the expected utility obtained by cooperation, drawn against b. The bliss
point achieved in the cooperative regime with the optimal public debt is denoted by
Co.
12Asufficient condition assuring this for the case where p =1/(1+r)is that the




Weturn now to characterize the opportunistic regime. Applying (6) we infer
that a higher planned public debt affects Vt0 by:
(10)
avi0=(1 [Mutlo -p(l+r)$+t(1- X+i)MU+iI0+'N+ip (1 -
Similarlyto the cooperative regime, starting with zero public debt the expected
utility of the opportunistic decision maker will tend to rise with the public debt
(recall that '(0) =0).As we increase the public debt, the marginal benefit of the debt
is eroded, while the cost (in terms of reducing the reelection probability) goes up. In
comparison to the cooperative regime, however, a higher public debt induces












thefuture)3 Hence, the presumption is that at the cooperative optimal public debt
(point CO) a higher public debt is desirable for the opportunistic decision maker.'4
Curves 0 and 0' describe two possible locations of the expected utility generated by
the opportunistic behavior, drawn against b.
If the opportunistic expected utility, at the optimal cooperative pubic debt, is
lower than the expected utility from cooperation, then we will observe cooperation.
In terms of Figure 1, this will happen if curve 0 is below curve C at the cooperative
optimal public debt, leading to a cooperative equilibrium at point CO.wherethe
public debt is at the level that maximizes the cooperative expected utility.If the
opportunistic utility is higher than the one achieved with cooperation at Ktic,
cooperation is not self sustained, and equilibrium will occur at a lower public debt.
For example, suppose that the opportunistic and cooperative expected utility
schedules are given by 0' and C'.15 Note that the cooperative equilibrium is
reached now at point CO', andis not sustainable, because all decision makers will
behave opportunistically. The resultant equilibrium must yield an expected utility
13The costs of higher public debt stem from the lower probability of reelection,
and lower net resources in the next period (when repayment is due). The lower
probability of survival of the opportunistic decision maker (relative to a decision
maker who behaves cooperatively) implies that the expected cost of a higher public
debt tends to be lower for him.
14A sufficient condition for this is a large enough X1+1.
15The existence of such a situation can be verified by noting that a smaller
value of A will shift the 0 curve upwards. For a value of A dose enough to zero
decision makers behave opportunistically at the cooperative equilibrium.- 15-
thatis below the optimal cooperative utility, on curve 0(A).16 The sustainable
equilibrium is characterized by the highest cooperative expected utility that does not
lead to deviations (and thus V!0 ￿ VI ),ata point like LC ,wherecurve 0'
intersects with C. We denote the corresponding public debt by bfuc, and refer to it as
the limited-cooperation public debt. This public debt is self-sustained as no benefits
are obtained by the opportunistic behavior. The administration does not reduce the
public debt below bfuc ,asthis will reduce expected utility; and it cannot push it
above, due to the presence of opportunistic behavior.
We turn now to evaluate the conditions that may induce an economy to
switch from cooperation to an equilibrium where cooperation is limited. Suppose
that the relevant curves in the initial equilibrium are CC and 00, and hence the
equilibrium is at point CD, corresponding to the cooperative regime. Let us consider
the impact of an adverse shock, like a transitory drop in taxes. For a given b', an
adverse fiscal shock will shift curves 0 and C vertically by (1- AJ[MUI0]ç and
[MUtIc)ç, respectively.Recall that G 10 > CI c' and thus MU0 c MUc.
Consequently: for z T c 0; [MlJtIc F'C(1- ?4MUIo ]<0. The drop is greater for
the utility in the cooperative regime. This follows from two reasons. Recall that the
pattern of consumption is front-loaded in the opportunistic regime, relative to the
cooperative one. The principle of diminishing marginal utility implies that a drop
in income equal in both regimes will induce a smaller drop in the expected utility
associated with the opportunistic regime, as this regime is associated with a higher
contemporaneous consumption. In addition, the probability of detection under the
opportunistic regime reduces the weight attached to the marginal loss in that
16Note that if all decision makers behave opportunistically, 0drops
considerably, reducing the realized expected utility. Thus, curve O'(A) is defined by
(6), for the case where b =i-nC.- 16-
régime,relative to the cooperative one. If we started with cooperation at a point like
CO. the likelihood of cooperation diminishes. If the adverse shock is large enough,
we may end up with limited cooperation, at a point like LC. Thus, we condude that
willingnessto cooperate among policy makers is in short supply when times are
bad. Our analysis can be readily extended to account for the effects of permanent
shocks, where the impact of a permanent drop in taxes is qualitatively similar, but
stronger, than the impact of a transitory drop.17
We turn now to evaluate the impact of transitory shocks on the optimal
public debt. Suppose that there is a transitory drop of taxes. In the cooperative
regime, it follows from (9) that18
(11)-l <dT
The public debt is used to smooth the fiscal consumption throughout the business
cycle, in line with the standard predictions of optimizing macroeconomic models.
In the regime with limited cooperation, however, the behavior of the public debt is
determined not by the 'first-best' economic considerations described above. Instead,
the dynamics of the public debt are determined by the binding incentive constraint —
preventingopportunistic behavior dictates the pattern of debt. To verify this point,
note first that in the vicinity of the limited cooperative equilibrium, curve C must
be flatter than curve 0' (otherwise everyone will be better off by increasing the
17In this case curves 0 and C drops vertically by
(1- AJ[MU110 + PGt+t (1- xt+i)MUt+iIo]ç and [Muttc + p4+iMU1+ilc+...
respectively.
18It can be verified that
4b]=-[MuJ42)=- [Mu;iJ(n2) > -l dTa 2 [vIJ/b]2Mu; + p(l+r)2$÷Mu;+1k
+ $c+t pV÷1I
112- 17-
publicdebt).Formally, definingDbyDVI0V I,at b=br0= 0and > 0.





Further insight may be obtained by referring to Figure 1. Suppose that prior
to the shock the relevant curves are CC and 00, and hence the equilibrium is at
point CO. corresponding to the cooperative regime. The adverse shock shifts both
curves down, but the shift of curve CC is larger. In terms of Figure 1, CC shifts to
CC', such that the desirable cooperative equilibrium calls for a higher public debt,
moving to point CO' (as is implied by (11)). If the shock is large, we may end up
with 00 above C'C' at the cooperative bliss point, as is drawn in Figure 1. In this
case, the ultimate equilibrium is at point LC, due to the constraints imposed by the
opportunistic behavior. The adjustment from the previous to the new equilibrium
can be broken into two parts: moving from CO to CO. reflecting the adjustment
within the cooperative regime, and the shift from CO1 to LC, reflecting the regime
switch. Note also that the regime switch is associated with a drop in the public debt,
needed to avoid the opportunistic outcome (i.e., the public debt is lower at LC
relative to CO'). Furthermore, when we operate in the regime associated with
limited cooperation, further adverse shocks will force a drop in the public debt,
needed to sustain the limited cooperation, preventing the switch to a
noncooperative outcome.
If the shock is large enough, the drop in CC may be large enough that the new
CCand 00 do not share any points. In this case limited cooperation is not
achievable --thenoncooperative forces are powerful enough to prevent the- 18-
attainmentof limited cooperation. In terms of Figure 1, this will imply that we end
up on curve O'(A). This is the case where the absence of cooperation releases
powerful negative externalities: each policy maker ignores the adverse effect of
opportunistic expenditure on the survival probability of all other decision makers,
ending up with an inefficient outcome, shortening the political horizon of all policy
makers. This is the stage where the resolution of the crisis may require fiscal
reform, shifting more power to the center, and tightening the monitoring of the
various decision makers.
The regime switch may yield nonlinearities, where the macroeconomic
behavior is abruptly altered following the regime switch, which in turn will occur if
the severity of adverse shocks reaches a certain threshold. In terms of equation (12),
note that aID/a bk—*0as we approach the switch from limited cooperation to the
noncooperative regime. Consequently, the sensitivity of the macroeconomic
variables (for instance, to public debt) to shocks increases sharply, and with regime
switch we may observe discontinuity in the patterns of public debt. Figure 2
describes the dependency of public debt on the tax at time t, where regions co, Ic and
nc correspond to the cooperative, limited cooperation and the noncooperative
regimes. 19
19Note that the switch to the noncooperative regime entails a change in the
administrations operation. It will set the planned public debt at the level that
maximizes the expected utility along curve O'(A).tic ic
FIGURE2
Co
Applying the above analysis, it follows that a large inherited public debt will
tie the hands of the policy makers, preventing them from using debt finance to
cushion adverse shocks. Let us denote by n the net resources available to the
administration in the absence of borrowing, lit =T-(1+r)b1. Let fl stand for the
threshold level of net resources that induces the opportunistic behavior of decision
makers.20 A cooperative equilibrium is sustainable as long as the realized tax
20The value of 11 is defined in the following way. The reduced form of the
expected utility of decision maker i depends on three factors: the net resources
- 19-- 20 -
revenueT exceeds 11 +(1+r)b1.A larger public debt increases the threshold of tax
revenue needed to sustain cooperation. Alternatively, it increases the chances that
the economy will switch to a regime where cooperation is limited (or to the
noncooperative regime), and where the public debt cannot be used effectively to
smooth public expenditure and public investment throughout recessions.21 Hence,
limits to public debt free the instrument of public debt to serve its traditional role.
available to the administration, the planned public debt, and the degree of
cooperation. Let VFi (bf; n) denote the expected utility of a decision maker for a
planned public debt and net resources n in regime k, k =cor o. The cooperative
equilibrium is sustainable only if Vlo(br;njs vi (bf; nj We define iiasthe lowest
net resources under which cooperation is sustainable: V10(bf; 11)= vIc(b';nj. In
terms of Figure 1, at n =lithecorresponding 00 curve intersects the CC curve at the
cooperative bliss point (hence points CO and LC coincide). Thus, for t < fl1
cooperation is not sustainable, and we operate in the Ic regime.
21This argument can be illustrated using Figure 2. A higher outstanding public
debt ((1 + r)b1) shifts the curve to the right, enlarging therange of the
noncooperative regime, and increasing the threshold level of taxes needed to
sustain cooperation.- 21-
4.Concluding Remarks
The above analysis pointed out that recessions (or lack of growth in the
economy) will reduce the degree of cooperation among policy makers. In the
context of fiscal expenditure, bad times may force policy makers to scale down the
public debt (or to expend it at a lower rate, relative to the first best, cooperative
outcome), exacerbating thereby the recession. Minimizing the prospects of this
scenario requires limiting the public debt in good times. While our discussion was
framed in a nonstochastic framework, it suggests that the public debt ceiling may be
related to the volatility of the shocks. Higher volatility of productivity shocks calls
for a lower limit on the allowed public debt, as the chance of switching to the
noncooperative regime goes up. Hence, the desirable public debt limit may be a
moving target that is adjusted to reflect expectations regarding the volatility of
future shocks.
A limitation of this analysis is that in practice there exists a wide spectrum of
financial arrangements between the peripheries and the center that may modify the
operation of these externalities. The message of this paper holds, however, as long
as these financial arrangements do not entirely curb the incentive to shift
expenditure from the peripheries to the center. For example, in Europe each
country may finance its own public debt issuing country-specific bonds. This
arrangement by itself does not negate the potential operation of the externalities
discussed above. The logic of our analysis prevails even if each union member has
its own debt, as long as there are some states of nature where the union members
can shift some of the financing of their expenditure to the center.- 22-
REFERENCES
Aizenman, 1(1992) "Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seigniorage,"
Journal of Money. Credit and Banlthg 24, 61 -71.
(1993) "Soft Budget Constraints, taxes and the incentive to cooperate,'
International Economic Review ,819-832.
Alesina, A. and Drazen, A. (1991) "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?", American
Economic Review (December), 1170-88.
Bryant J. (1985) "Analyzing Deficit Finance in a Regime of Unbacked Government
Paper," Economic Review. Federal Bank of Dallas 15, 17-27.
Buiter W. H. and R. C. Marston, eds. (1985)International Economic Policy
Coordination. (New York: Cambridge University press).
Canzoneri, B. M. (1989) "Adverse Incentives in the Taxation of Foreigners", Journal
of International Economics 27, 283-97.
______________andGray, I. A.(1985) "Monetary Policy Games and the
Consequences of Non-cooperative Behavior," International Economic
Review 26. 547 -64.
Casella A. (1991) "Participation in a Currency Union," American Economic Review,
81, pp. 847-863.
Cukierman, A., Central Bank Strategy. Credibility and Independence: Theory and
Evidence. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992.
De Grauwe P. (1992) "The Economics of Monetary Integration", Oxford University
Press.
Hamada, K. (1976) "A Strategic Analysis of Monetary Interdependency," Journal of
Political Economy 84 ,677-700.
Persson, T. and G. Tabeflini. (1990) "Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics,"
(Harwood Academic Press, Chu.r, Switzerland).- 23-
Rogoff,K. S. (1989) "Reputation, Coordination and Monetary Policy." In Modern
Business Cycle Theory. edited by K J. Barro, (Harvard Press).
Tome!! A. and A. Velasco. (1992) "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic
Growth: Why Does Capital Flow From Poor to Rich Countries? Journal of
Political Economy. Vol. 100,December
Tumnovsky S. J., Tamer B. and V. D'orey. (1989) "Dynamic Strategic Monetary
policies and Coordination in Interdependent Economies,' American
Economic Review 78, 341-361.
World Bank, Argentina: Provincial Government Finance (Washington, The World
Bank, 1990).
Wyplosz, C. (1991) "Monetary Union and Fiscal Policy Discipline? EC Commission,
European Economy, Special Edition, 1.